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Intra-and Extra-Union Flexibility in Meeting the European 
Union’s Emission Reduction Targets 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has announced ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets 
for 2020, even if there is no wider international agreement on climate policy. In order to 
achieve this goal, the EU is creating a complex regulatory regime with differentiated 
targets, a range of policy instruments and restrictions on their application, and a variety of 
fungibilities between selected parts of the regulation. As a further complication, there are 
separate targets and instruments for renewable energy and energy efficiency; and 
emission reduction policy of course interacts with other arenas, including fiscal policy, 
industrial policy, and agricultural policy. To an outsider, the array of measures and 
initiatives is bewildering and clearly violates the simple prescriptions of textbook 
economics. As the European Commission has yet to publish a regulatory impact 
assessment, it is not clear to what extent the regulatory regime creates new distortions. 
Nor is it clear how far current policy is removed from the cost-effective policy.1 
Therefore, this paper seeks to analyze the regulatory regime – but because of the 
complexities, I focus on one specific part only: the market in warrants for certified 
emission reductions, and its interactions with the two primary markets for emission 
permits in the European Union.2 
 
Certified emission reductions (CERs) are the reward for companies and governments that 
invest in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the initiative through which rich 
                                                 
1 Note that the EU targets are not efficient (Tol 2007;Tol 2008). 
2 Other papers focus on the artificial separation of emission reduction targets (Boehringer et al. 
2006;Klepper & Peterson 2006), the interactions between abatement and other targets (Boehringer et al. 
2008), the interactions between climate policy and other policies (Babiker et al. 2003;Dellink & van Ierland 
2006;Fischer 2008;Palmer et al. 2007;Settle et al. 2007), the effect on climate policy on industrial 
competitiveness (Kuik & Gerlagh 2003), the functioning of the European Trading System (Benz & Trück 
2009;Convery & Redmond 2007;Ellerman & Buchner 2007), and flexibility instruments for non-ETS 
emissions (Reilly et al. 2006;Tol 2009). There are also papers on flexibility in the renewables targets 
(Mundaca 2008;Oikonomou et al. 2008), and on linking EU permit markets to other permit markets (Anger 
2008;Rehdanz & Tol 2005;Tol & Rehdanz 2008). 
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countries can finance emission abatement project in poor countries. The CDM is part of 
the Kyoto Protocol and thus due to expire in 2013, but something very similar is likely to 
be part of the international treaty that would succeed the Kyoto Protocol. If not, the EU 
would probably reach bilateral agreements with key countries that host CDM projects. In 
any case, the EU foresees a role for the CDM in its package of policies and measures to 
meet its targets for 2020. In fact, the EU expects that there will be an abundant supply of 
cheap CERs in 2020 – and in order to preserve “environmental integrity”, has placed 
limits on the uptake of the CDM by EU Member States. Specifically, Member States may 
import only 3% of their 2005 emissions as CERs, although selected Member States may 
buy up to 4%.3 
In the proposed regulation (CEC 2008b;EP 2008), the CDM quotas of EU Member States 
are tradable between countries. That is, the United Kingdom, say, may purchase the right 
to buy CERs from Poland, say – and the UK would if its marginal costs of emission 
reduction are higher than in Poland. The EU has thus created a market for CER 
warrants.4 As with any emission permit market, this reduces the overall cost of meeting 
the target – but one should not forget that this market exists by virtue of artificial 
restrictions placed on the primary and secondary market. As with any market with a 
limited number of buyers and sellers (27 in this case), there may be issues of market 
power, rents, and reallocation of the burden of emission reduction. These issues are 
explored below. 
Furthermore, the market for CER warrants interacts with the other markets for emission 
permits: the European Trading System that has been in place since 2005 and the newly 
created Member State exchange for non-ETS allocations (the so-called Swedish 
proposal). As CERs are not tied to either market, one would expect that the CDM would 
bring a degree of convergence between the ETS and non-ETS markets – and that the 
CER warrant market would bring further convergence. These issues are also addressed by 
the current paper. 
                                                 
3 The implications of this restriction are straightforward. If emission reduction in a country is more 
expensive at the margin than the CER price, it should buy up to its limit. It is has yet to be investigated, 
however, how a national government should allocate its CDM quota to the companies in its jurisdiction. 
4 Note that there is already a market for the development of CDM projects, a secondary market on which 
the resulting CERs are traded, and a futures market for CERs. 
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In Section 2, I present an analytically tractable model of emission reduction and permit 
trade in the European Union. The model is calibrated to the impact assessment of the 
2020 targets of the European Commission. The model is simple, but captures all the 
relevant features. In Section 3, I investigate the properties of the market for CDM 
warrants and its interaction with the regulations for ETS and non-ETS emissions. Section 
4 concludes. 
 
2. The model and its calibration 
 
2.1. The primary markets 
Let us consider a market for tradable emission reduction permits with I countries. 
Emission reduction costs C are quadratic. Without CDM, each country solves the 
problem: 
(1a) 2
,
min  s.t. 
i i
i i i i i i i i i iR P
C R Y P R E P E Aα π= + + ≥ −  
where Y is gross domestic product, indexed by i; R is relative emission reduction; P 
denotes the amount of emission permits bought or sold; π is the emission permit price 
(assuming a perfect market, all companies face the same price, so there is no index); E 
are the emissions without emission reduction, so that E(1-R)+P are the emissions with 
emission reduction; A are the allocated emission permits; that is, if a country emits more 
than has been allocated, E>A, it will have to reduce emissions or buy permits on the 
market; and α is a parameter. If a country’s allocation exceeds its emissions, E<A, the 
optimization problem is: 
(1b) 2
,
min  s.t. 
j j
j j j j j j j j j jR P
C R Y R E P P E Aα π π= − + ≥ −  
We assume that the country sells its hot air P=E-A, and in addition reduces emissions by 
RE which it sells at the market for πRE. Countries with hot air are indexed by j. Countries 
without emission reduction targets are excluded from the market, that is CDM and similar 
instruments are not considered. 
The first order conditions of (1) are: 
(2a) 
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where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. This is a system with 3(I+J) equations and 
3(I+J)+1 unknowns, but we also have that aggregate supply must equal aggregate 
demand, that is 
(2d) 
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which allows us to solve for the permit price π as well. (2) solves as: 
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So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the costs 
of emission reduction increase. All countries face the same marginal costs of emission 
reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and buying or selling 
permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs and the permit price. 
The modelled market behaves as expected. 
We consider two cases. First, model (1-3) is applied separately to the emissions covered 
by the European Trading System and to the remaining emissions which are covered by 
the newly created Member State exchange for non-ETS emission allocation. Second, 
model (1-3) is applied to ETS emissions only. Note that the solution for non-ETS 
emissions without the market in emission permits (Pi=0) is trivial. 
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2.2. Certified emission reductions and the market in CDM warrants 
The model in Section 2.1 was used to investigate the properties of the ETS and non-ETS 
markets (Tol 2009). That paper, however, omitted the Clean Development Mechanisms. 
This is added here. 
Let us first consider the case without a CDM warrant market, and without trade in non-
ETS emission allocations. There are three corner solutions. (1) The CER price is higher 
than the ETS price and higher than the marginal costs of non-ETS emission reduction. In 
this case, a Member State would not avail of its right to purchase CERs. (2) The non-ETS 
marginal cost is higher than the ETS price. In this case, a Member State would purchase 
CERs up to its 3% or 4% limit and use the CERs to lower its non-ETS emission reduction 
obligation. (3) The non-ETS marginal cost is lower than the ETS price. In this case, a 
Member State would purchase CERs up to its 3% or 4% limit and use the CERs to lower 
its ETS emission reduction obligation, thus reducing the ETS price for all other Member 
States as well. Besides the corner solutions, there may be an interior solution that mixes 
two or three of the above cases. Although the 3% limit on the use of CERs seems strict, 
the results below reveal that interior solutions are in fact quite common. 
Let us now consider a market in CDM warrants. Again, there are three different corner 
solutions. (1) The CER price is higher than the ETS and the non-ETS price. No CERs 
would be bought. (2) The ETS price is higher than the non-ETS price; and the CER price 
is lower than the ETS price. Member States would purchase CERs up to their limit, and 
sell them on in the ETS market. There is no point in selling on the CDM warrant to 
another Member State as this would entail transaction costs but no gains. This can also be 
seen from Equation (3a) The ETS price is affected by the total emission allocation only – 
but not by the allocations to individual Member States. The ETS price determines the 
marginal abatement cost of all Member States, indeed equalizes them. This means that 
there no gains from reallocating CERs from one Member State to another. (3) The non-
ETS price is higher. Member States would purchase CERs, and sell them on the non-ETS 
market. The warrant market is again defunct. 
There may also be interior solutions, in which CERs are shared between ETS and non-
ETS, or indeed not fully used. Also in this case, there is no need for a CDM warrant 
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market through which ETS and non-ETS targets are re-allocated. The ETS and non-ETS 
markets are well able to do that. 
That is, if there are markets for both ETS and non-ETS emission rights, there is no need 
for a market in CDM warrants. Rational actors would not trade at that market. 
Note that the EU did create an ETS market, a non-ETS market, and a CDM warrant 
market. The warrant market is redundant. If all parties in all markets are aware of this, the 
warrant market is just a piece of unnecessary but otherwise innocent regulation. If not, 
confusion may be the result. 
If there is no market for non-ETS permit, but there is a CDM warrant market, the 
following would happen. Let us assume that the ETS and CER prices are lower than the 
marginal abatement costs in the non-ETS sector in all Member States. Then, for a given 
supply of CERs, countries solve the problem: 
(4) ( )2
,
min  s.t. ,
i i
C W
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iR W
C R Y D W W R E D W E A W Dα π π= + + + + + ≥ − ≥ −  
where D is the maximum amount of CERs that can be used; W is the net amount of CDM 
warrants bought; πC is the price of CERs; and πW is the price of CDM warrants. To 
understand the notation, first consider W = 0. In this case, is πW ineffective and the 
emission abatement obligation is reduced by D. If W > 0, country i buys more CERs and 
has to buy CDM warrants as well; but in return reduces less at home. If W < 0, country i 
buys fewer CERs, sells warrants, and reduces more at home. And, of course, the amount 
of CDM warrants sold cannot exceed the country’s limit on CDM access D. 
This has first order conditions: 
(5a) 2 0i i i iRYα λ− =  
(5b) i i i i i iR E E A D W= − − −  
(5c) i iW D= −  
(5d) 0C W i iπ π λ μ+ − − =  
This solves as (5c) and 
(6a) ( )i i i i i iR E A D D E= − − −  
(6b) ( )2i i i i i i i iY E A D W Eλ α= − − −  
(6c) ( )2C Di i i i i i i iY E A D W Eμ π π α= + − − − −  
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Equation (6c) relates the shadow price of the availability of CERs to its constraint. The 
shadow price is the willingness to pay to release the constraint at the margin, so Equation 
(6c) is in fact an inverse demand function. Equation (6c) is linear, so it is obvious that it 
doubles as an inverse supply function for those countries that would sell their CDM 
warrants to other countries. The market clears where πW is such that all μis are zero and 
the sum total of CERs is equal to total allowed use of the CDM. 
If non-ETS marginal costs are higher than the ETS price in some countries, but lower in 
others,5 there is an additional opportunity for arbitrage. Countries would supply a share 
of their CDM warrants to the non-ETS and use the remainder to buy CERs and sell them 
in the ETS – up to the point where the price of a CDM warrant equals the price difference 
between ETS and CDM. There need not be an interior solution to this, in which case all 
CERs go to either ETS or non-ETS. 
 
2.3. Model calibration 
The model is calibrated in four steps. The 2020 emission reduction targets are relative to 
2005 emissions. We use two sets of data for total greenhouse gas emissions in 2005: the 
official country statistics as reported to the UNFCCC, and the emissions reported in 
impact assessment of the European Commission (Capros et al. 2008). See Table A1. 
There are substantial, unexplained differences between the data. The UNFCCC data 
allow for a reasonable approximation of the ETS share in the 2005 emissions.6 See Table 
A2. The sector detail is much less for the European Commission data, and therefore I use 
an upper and lower bound of the ETS share, by putting all industry emissions and all non-
energy CO2 emissions inside or outside the ETS. I refer to these calibrations as EUmax 
and EUmin. The European Commission study reports total emissions in 2005 and 2020 as 
well as growth rates for ETS and non-ETS emissions. Together, this implies ETS and 
                                                 
5 Recall that there are countries with hot air. These countries would supply all their CDM warrants to other 
countries as long as the warrant price or the ETS is greater than the CER price. 
6 Note that the ETS / non-ETS split is an approximation because the UNFCCC statistics follow the sectoral 
classification of the International Energy Agency, while the ETS is based on installations. For instance, the 
power plant of a large university would be classified as “institutional” in the UNFCCC – and would thus be 
placed outside the ETS even though it is in reality covered. 
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non-ETS emissions in 2005 and 2020.7 This results in negative emissions for Denmark 
and Luxembourg, so I replaced the ETS share for these countries with average of the 
upper and lower bound. I refer to this calibration as EUmid.8 Note that EUmid does not 
necessarily lie in between EUmax and EUmin (see Table A2), which suggests that there 
are further problems with the data of Capros et al. (2008). 
For 2020, I use four alternative emissions projections, viz. (1) the UNFCCC data for 
2005 with the ETS and non-ETS growth rates of (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & 
Tasios 2008); (2) the EU data for 2005 and 2020 with lower bound ETS; (3) the EU data 
with upper bound ETS; and (4) the EU data as calibrated above. See Table A1 for the 
total emissions, and Table A2 for the ETS share. 
I use a single projection (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008) for population 
and Gross Domestic Product. In Western Europe, the population grows by 0.25% per 
year between 2005 and 2020 and the economy by 2.09%, so that GDP per capita 
increases by 1.84%. Southern Europe grows slightly faster, with a population growth of 
0.26% and an economic growth of 2.29% per year. GDP per capita in Southern Europe 
thus grows at 2.03%. Southern Europe catches up with Western Europe, but only slowly. 
The average GDP/capita in Western Europe in 2020 is projected to be €39,170 compared 
on €29,702 in Southern Europe. In Eastern Europe, population is assumed to fall by 
0.32% per year while the economy grows by 4.51% per year. GDP/capita grows by 
4.85% per year to €12,656 in 2020. 
For each of the four emissions baselines, I calibrate the unit cost parameters αi for 
emission reduction in the ETS by assuming that these are proportional to the square root 
of the relative carbon efficiency of the economy (Rehdanz et al. 2006), as follows: 
(5) 1.57 0.17 mini ii i
i i
E E
Y Y
α ∝ − −  
Furthermore, I assume that π=€40/tCO2 in 2020 (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 
2008). See Table A3. 
                                                 
7 We know that E2005 + N2005 = M2005, where E2005 are ETS emissions in 2005, N are non-ETS emissions and 
M are total emissions. We also know that E2020 + N2020 = E2005(1+gE)15 + N2005(1+gM)15 = M2020 where gE is 
the annual growth rate of ETS emissions, and gM of non-ETS emissions. Capros et al. (2008) report M2005, 
M2020, gE and gM, so that we have two equations and two unknowns (E2005, N2005). 
8 The UNFCCC values for Cyprus and Malta are set equal to their EUmid values. 
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The unit cost parameters αi for non-ETS emissions are set such that the cost-effective 
non-ETS emission reduction targets of (Capros, Mantzos, Papandreou, & Tasios 2008) 
are cost-effective in this model as well. See Table A4. For EUmid, there is a variant: I 
calibrate the unit cost parameters such that the marginal cost is as reported in the impact 
assessment of the European Commission (CEC 2008a;CEC 2008b).9 I refer to this 
scenario as EUprice. 
 
3. Scenarios and results 
 
3.1. Policy scenarios 
I distinguish seven different policy cases. See Table 1. In all cases, there is trade in 
emission permits in the EU Emission Trading Scheme. In the first case, the ETS is the 
only flexibility instrument. In the second case, I add the non-tradable 1% access to CDM 
for selected countries, and let Member States chose whether to loosen ETS or non-ETS 
targets. In the third case, I add the 3% access to CDM, and let Member States freely 
allocate this to either the ETS or the non-ETS sector. In the fourth case, there is trade in 
CDM warrants between those countries that have allocated their CERs to their non-ETS 
emissions. In the fifth case, there is no CDM, but there is a market for non-ETS emission 
permits. In the sixth case, I reintroduce the 1% CDM for selected countries; and in the 
seventh case, I add the 3% CDM. 
 
3.2. EU-wide results 
Table 2 shows the first set of results, focusing on the total economic cost to the EU in 
2020. In the central model calibration (EUmid), the economic cost amounts to 1.3% of 
GDP if the ETS is the only flexible instrument. The costs drop to 0.9% of GDP if the 
CDM is used to its maximum amount of 3% or 4% of 2005 emissions. A market for 
CDM warrants further reduces costs, but only marginally. 66% percent of CERs are used 
to offset ETS emissions, the remaining 34% is used in the non-ETS sector. 
                                                 
9 Note that there are four countries with hot air. I keep the unit cost parameters as in the EUmid scenario. 
For Portugal, I reduced the baseline non-ETS emissions to the target. 
 11
The impact of the CDM, however limited in size, is impressive compared to the impact of 
the Swedish proposal which introduces trade in non-ETS emission allotments. The 
Swedish proposal reduces costs to 1.2% of GDP only. Of course, costs are lowest (0.7% 
of GDP) if the CDM and Swedish proposal are combined. In this case, all CERs are used 
in the ETS market. 
Table 3 shows the permit price. With the ETS only, the permit price is calibrated to be 
€40/tCO2. This falls to €35/tCO2 with CDM access, and to €30/tCO2 with both CDM and 
non-ETS trade – the latter result holds because trade in non-ETS allotments takes the 
pressure of that sector and releases CERs to the ETS. CDM warrants would trade at 
€23/tCO2 – that is, Member States are prepared to pay €23/tCO2 for the right to buy a 
CER at the assumed price of €10/tCO2/tCO2. The ETS price is €33/tCO2 in this case. In 
the non-ETS sector, the permit price is €27. This is always below the ETS price, so no 
CDM is deployed to offset non-ETS emissions (cf. Table 2). Table 3 also shows that if 
the CDM limit is raised from 3.0% to 3.8%, the ETS and non-ETS price are equal, that is, 
the emissions target is met at the lowest possible cost. The permit price is then €27/tCO2. 
 
The above results hold for one particular interpretation of the base year (2005), the no 
policy scenario, and the marginal abatement cost curve. Tables 2 and 3 also show results 
for the four alternative calibrations outlined in the previous section. The qualitative 
pattern in Table 2 is identical: More flexibility means lower costs, and the CDM is more 
effective at lowering costs than the Swedish proposal. Table 3 confirms this, but finds 
that the ETS price converges to the non-ETS price! In fact, if all CERs were allocated to 
the ETS, the ETS price would fall below the non-ETS price. That would be irrational, so 
CERs are shared between the two markets. Table 2 shows that less than one-third of the 
CERs is allocated to the non-ETS sector in the EUmin calibration, and less than one-
twentieth in the other three calibrations. That is, the interaction between the three markets 
is such they in fact function as a single market. 
In each of the five alternative model calibrations, the non-ETS permit price is below the 
ETS permit price. The reason is the overallocation of non-ETS permits to countries in 
Eastern and Southern Europe. In order to test the sensitivity of the results to this, Tables 2 
and 3 show the results of higher projected emissions and higher non-ETS abatement 
costs, in both cases taking the EUmid calibration for 2005. Not surprisingly, emission 
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reduction costs are higher. The qualitative pattern in Table 2 does not change, however. 
More flexibility means lower costs, and CDM access is more important than non-ETS 
trade. Table 3 reveals that the price of CDM warrants is well above the price of ETS 
permits. Consequently, all CERs are used in the non-ETS sector. For the same reason, the 
trade in rights to purchase CERs has a bigger effect. For instance, in the high cost case, 
total abatement costs are reduced from 1.4% of GDP to 1.3% of GDP. Under the Swedish 
proposal, CDM access reduces the marginal cost of non-ETS abatement, but the permit 
price stays above the ETS permit price. CDM access would have to rise from 3.0% of 
2005 emissions to 3.7% (high cost case) or even 6.5% (high emissions case) for the 
market prices to equilibrate. 
Finally, Tables 2 and 3 show what happens if the price of CERs is not €10/tCO2 but 
rather €5/tCO2 or €15/tCO2. The impact is minimal. Overall costs fall or rise with a 
higher CER price, but the effect is not very large. ETS and non-ETS permit prices are 
hardly affected as they are still much higher than the CER price. The only substantial 
impact is on the price of CDM warrants: The higher (lower) the CER price, the lower 
(higher) the warrant price, almost one-to-one with the CER price. The effect on 
abatement is muted, however, kept in check by market forces and alternative options to 
abate emissions. In the base case (€10/tCO2), 66.09% of CERs are used to offset ETS 
emissions. With a low CER price (€5/tCO2), this rises to 66.11%; with a high CER price 
(€15/tCO2) this falls to 65.96%. 
 
3.3. Results per Member State 
Table 4 shows the total cost of emission abatement for each of the 27 Member States in 
the 7 policy cases, for the EUmid calibration and for costs, projections, and CER price as 
in the central case. 
There is substantial variation in costs between the Member States if the ETS is the only 
flexibility mechanism. The EU average of 1.3% of GDP hides gains of 10.1% for 
Bulgaria and losses of 5.1% for Latvia. Increasing flexibility reduces the overall costs to 
the EU and to most of the Member States. However, Latvia faces the highest costs in all 
policy scenarios, and its costs fall by less than the average as flexibility increases. This is 
because its marginal abatement cost curve is shallower than any other Member State, so 
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that it cannot compete at the margin. Cyprus and Poland turn from net losers to net 
winners as flexibility increases, and the Czech Republic similar sees more export 
opportunities with increasing flexibility. On the other hand, Bulgaria, Estonia (non-ETS 
only), and Malta are outcompeted and see their gains of permit trade fall as flexibility 
increases. This implies that increased flexibility is not Pareto superior. The current 
regulation (ETS only) creates scarcity rents that some Member States would prefer to 
keep. 
Table 5 shows the total allocation of CERs, and the CERs used to offset non-ETS 
emissions in case the ETS is the only flexibility mechanism. Without a market for CDM 
warrants, the pattern of ETS/non-ETS allocation essentially follows the marginal 
abatement costs. Countries with high (low) non-ETS abatement costs allocate all (none) 
of their CERs to the non-ETS sectors. For some countries, the marginal abatement costs 
in the non-ETS are sufficiently close to the ETS price. These countries allocate part of 
their CERs to the non-ETS sector, and the remainder to the ETS. 
With a market for CDM warrants, the allocation changes for two reasons. First, prices 
and marginal costs change. This leads to a reallocation between ETS and non-ETS 
independent of trade per se. Belgium is an example. Second, some countries reallocate 
part of their CERs to the non-ETS sector for the sole purpose of selling them on to other 
Member States. Poland is an example. 
Table 5 also shows the market shares at the market for CDM warrants. The market is 
concentrated both at the demand and the supply side. At the supply side, the HHI is 1665, 
usually a reason for concern. Poland is the biggest seller, with almost one-third of the 
market. The Czech Republic, Greece and Romania each have more than 10% of the 
market. At the demand side, concentration is even higher with a HHI of 3924. Denmark 
buys 58% of all warrants, Luxemburg 21% and Sweden 11%. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
The European Union (EU) plans to introduce four kinds of flexibility in the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2013-2020: (1) the emissions trading scheme 
(ETS), a permit market for companies in selected sectors; (2) trade between Member 
State in non-ETS emission reduction obligations; (3) investments in (the successor to) the 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to reduce emissions outside the EU; and (4) 
trade between Member States in CDM warrants. This paper considers the interactions 
between these four markets. 
The key findings are as follows. Greater flexibility reduces overall costs. However, 
limited flexibility creates rents for certain Member States, which consequently may 
oppose increased flexibility. Access to the CDM is more effective at reducing costs than 
is non-ETS trade. The market in CDM warrants is small, concentrated, and relatively 
ineffective in case there is no trade in non-ETS allotments. If there is non-ETS trade, the 
CDM warrant market is superfluous. These results are robust to the calibration of the 
model and to the projections of future emissions. The prices of carbon in the ETS and the 
non-ETS sector converge due to access to the CDM. In some calibrations, convergence is 
compete for the proposed access limit to the CDM while in other calibrations a relatively 
modest extension of the limit would imply that there is a single price for greenhouse gas 
emissions across Member States and sectors. 
The above results come with a number of caveats. The results are based on a simple 
model. More elaborate models would be harder to solve without adding much insight – 
unless, of course, interactions and complications are introduced that are omitted from the 
current analysis. Chief among these are EU energy policy; intra-union trade in goods and 
services; and interactions with fiscal, energy and agricultural policy. The current paper 
tacitly assumes that permit markets are perfect. I do find signs of market power for the 
trade of CDM warrants – but that market is obsolete. The non-ETS market may be 
imperfect too. The current paper also omits any discussion of how markets could and 
should be designed. I simply assumed that there will be functioning markets. The 
proposed regulations are complicated, and this increases the administrative burden of 
companies and regulators alike. The proposed regulations also have a number of 
ambiguities, the most important of which is the creation of an obsolete market. These 
issues will be ironed out, but they do increase regulatory uncertainty in the interim. All of 
these issues are deferred to future research. 
Subject to these caveats, however, the bottom-line conclusion of this paper is that the 
European Union created, in a roundabout way and with unnecessary administrative costs 
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and regulatory uncertainty, a set of regulations for greenhouse gas emission abatement 
that is close to cost-effective or perhaps even cost-effective. 
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Table 1. Policy scenarios 
 Casea ETS non-ETS CDM WM 
1 ETS Yes No 0% n/a 
2 ETS+1 Yes No 1% n/a 
3 ETS+1+3 Yes No 1%+3% No 
4 ETS+1+3+WM Yes No 1%+3% Yes 
5 ETS+SP Yes Yes 0% n/a 
6 ETS+SP+1 Yes Yes 1% n/a 
7 ETS+SP+1+3 Yes Yes 1%+3% n/a 
a ETS: Emission trading scheme; 1: 1% CDM for selected countries; 3: 3% CDM for all 
countries; WM: warrant market; SP: Swedish proposal 
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Table 2. The total cost (in %GDP of the EU27 in 2020) of meeting the emission targets 
for seven different policy cases (columns) and nine different model calibration (rows). 
The right-most column has share of CERs allocated to the ETS in the case of the Swedish 
proposal with 1+3% CDM. 
Case 1 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 7 
CDM 0 1 1+3 1+3 0 1 1+3 
WM No No No Yes No No No 
SP No No No No 
Share 
CER 
in ETS Yes Yes Yes 
Share 
CER 
in ETS 
EUmid 1.313 1.273 0.995 0.994 66% 1.159 1.130 0.774 100% 
EUmin 1.215 1.176 0.899 0.896 40% 1.044 1.013 0.685 71% 
EUmax 1.364 1.325 1.045 1.044 59% 1.218 1.187 0.835 96% 
EUprice 1.484 1.419 1.083 1.053 40% 1.192 1.169 0.807 97% 
UN 1.204 1.167 0.888 0.887 58% 1.043 1.015 0.680 97% 
High emit 2.694 2.642 2.051 1.972 0% 2.271 2.228 1.878 100% 
High cost 2.219 2.103 1.406 1.302 0% 1.747 1.673 1.174 100% 
High CDM 1.313 1.276 1.048 1.047 66% 1.159 1.133 0.774 100% 
Low CDM 1.313 1.270 0.942 0.942 66% 1.159 1.127 0.774 100% 
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Table 3. The price of emission permits (in €/tCO2) in the ETS, the warrant market for 
CDM, and the non-ETS, for nine alternative model calibrations and seven policy cases 
(cf. Table 1). The second-right-most column shows the limit to the CDM for which ETS 
and non-ETS equilibrate, and the right-most column the price at which the two markets 
equilibrate. 
 ETS price WM Non-ETS price CDM 
Case 1 2 3 7 4 4 5 6 7 7 7 
CDM 0 1 1+3 1+3 1+3 1+3 0 1 1+3 % €/tCO2 
SP No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ARM No No No No Yes No No No No No No 
Mid 40.0 39.6 33.2 29.9 33.3 33.3 27.4 27.4 27.4 3.8 27.4 
Min 40.0 39.3 32.5 27.9 33.2 33.2 30.8 30.3 27.9 3.0 27.9 
Max 40.0 39.5 33.8 30.1 33.9 33.9 30.7 30.0 30.1 3.0 30.1 
Price 40.0 39.9 33.8 30.2 35.9 35.9 30.7 29.3 30.2 3.0 30.2 
UN 40.0 39.5 33.1 28.7 33.2 33.2 29.3 28.7 28.7 3.0 28.7 
High emit 40.0 40.0 38.0 29.9 40.0 53.2 50.8 49.8 40.6 6.5 29.9 
High cost 40.0 39.9 36.9 29.9 39.9 64.1 83.9 79.8 39.5 3.7 29.9 
High CDM 40.0 39.6 33.2 29.9 33.3 33.3 27.4 27.4 27.4 3.8 27.4 
Low CDM 40.0 39.6 33.2 29.9 33.3 33.3 27.4 27.4 27.4 3.8 27.4 
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Table 4. The total cost (in %GDP in 2020) per Member State of meeting the emission 
targets for seven different policy cases (cf. Table 1). 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CDM 0 1 1+3 1+3 0 1 1+3 
WM No No No Yes No No No 
SP No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Austria 1.816 1.719 1.381 1.383 1.738 1.674 1.208 
Belgium 1.983 1.840 1.506 1.507 1.954 1.805 1.345 
Bulgaria -10.106 -9.771 -6.435 -6.497 -13.439 -12.999 -8.207 
Cyprus 0.362 0.218 0.011 0.012 0.354 0.213 -0.050 
Czechia -1.123 -1.078 -1.079 -1.089 -2.140 -2.049 -2.021 
Denmark 1.463 1.309 0.904 0.870 1.059 1.005 0.684 
Estonia 0.523 0.584 0.737 0.726 -0.128 -0.025 0.178 
Finland 1.544 1.416 1.102 1.103 1.523 1.393 0.963 
France 0.642 0.641 0.459 0.459 0.603 0.596 0.374 
Germany 0.972 0.977 0.779 0.778 0.953 0.957 0.695 
Greece 1.012 1.012 0.673 0.672 0.964 0.973 0.508 
Hungary 1.772 1.785 1.510 1.508 1.351 1.391 0.976 
Ireland 2.127 2.004 1.577 1.580 1.931 1.865 1.335 
Italy 2.300 2.189 1.790 1.793 2.193 2.123 1.549 
Latvia 5.082 5.049 4.306 4.314 4.990 4.975 3.852 
Lithuania 2.044 2.028 1.494 1.497 1.336 1.367 0.565 
Luxembourg 1.989 1.885 1.560 1.529 1.699 1.628 1.282 
Malta -3.103 -3.064 -2.849 -2.858 -3.240 -3.188 -2.800 
Netherlands 2.376 2.364 1.892 1.895 2.268 2.246 1.657 
Poland 1.608 1.613 1.080 1.079 0.256 0.333 -0.462 
Portugal 2.084 1.913 1.485 1.486 1.872 1.714 1.091 
Romania 2.336 2.376 2.228 2.222 1.143 1.258 0.972 
Slovakia 2.251 2.271 2.001 1.998 1.600 1.659 1.233 
Slovenia 1.862 1.857 1.448 1.449 1.811 1.817 1.240 
Spain 1.418 1.287 1.017 1.017 1.376 1.236 0.887 
Sweden 1.822 1.752 1.433 1.435 1.722 1.675 1.241 
UK 1.012 1.011 0.716 0.717 0.917 0.913 0.612 
EU 1.313 1.273 0.995 0.994 1.159 1.130 0.774 
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Table 5. The total (1%+3%) allocation of CERs (in million metric tonne of carbon 
dioxide per year) per Member State, the allocation to the non-ETS sector (without non-
ETS trade) with and without a CDM warrant market, the net purchase of CDM warrants, 
and the total allocation of CERs to the non-ETS sector after trade. The rightmost column 
gives the market share on the CDM warrants market, where negatives denote net sellers 
and positive net buyers. 
 Total Non-ETS 
  No WM WM 
Net 
purchase 
Total 
WM 
Market 
share 
Case 3, 4, 7 3 4 4 4 4 
Austria 3.9 2.1 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.1% 
Belgium 5.7 0.9 2.3 0.0 2.3 0.1% 
Bulgaria 2.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -5.6% 
Cyprus 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.4% 
Czechia 4.4 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.0 -12.5% 
Denmark 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.3 4.0 57.6% 
Estonia 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6% 
Finland 2.8 0.4 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0% 
France 16.8 7.9 7.7 0.0 7.7 0.7% 
Germany 30.1 4.5 4.5 0.0 4.5 0.2% 
Greece 4.0 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.0 -11.4% 
Hungary 2.4 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -6.8% 
Ireland 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.2 3.2 7.9% 
Italy 23.0 15.1 14.9 0.0 15.0 0.5% 
Latvia 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.9% 
Lithuania 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.7% 
Luxembourg 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.0 20.5% 
Malta 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3% 
Netherlands 6.6 5.5 5.4 0.0 5.4 0.1% 
Poland 11.2 0.0 0.8 -0.8 0.0 -32.2% 
Portugal 3.5 0.0 1.0 -0.2 0.9 -7.5% 
Romania 4.5 0.0 0.3 -0.3 0.0 -12.9% 
Slovakia 1.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -4.4% 
Slovenia 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.7% 
Spain 18.0 3.4 7.7 0.0 7.7 1.1% 
Sweden 2.8 2.8 2.8 0.3 3.1 11.1% 
UK 21.1 8.2 8.2 0.0 8.2 0.1% 
EU 172.9 57.0 66.2 0.0 66.2  
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Table A1. Greenhouse gas emissions (million metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent) 
in 2005 and 2020, and the average annual growth rate. 
 EU UNFCCC 
 2005 2020 growth 2005 2020 Growth 
Austria 97.9 104.2 0.42 93.5 98.6 0.35 
Belgium 141.4 152.5 0.51 142.3 151.3 0.41 
Bulgaria 65.2 68.4 0.32 70.5 73.3 0.26 
Cyprus 8.6 8.5 -0.08 8.6 8.4 -0.16 
Czechia 145.4 143.0 -0.11 145.9 143.8 -0.09 
Denmark 66.0 64.5 -0.16 63.6 62.1 -0.16 
Estonia 18.9 21.7 0.93 19.3 22.2 0.94 
Finland 69.1 70.6 0.14 69.1 70.1 0.10 
France 561.0 555.7 -0.06 562.9 550.5 -0.15 
Germany 1003.3 999.4 -0.03 1005.4 984.3 -0.14 
Greece 131.8 136.6 0.24 133.8 136.8 0.14 
Hungary 78.9 90.8 0.94 80.2 91.9 0.91 
Ireland 75.8 80.7 0.42 70.4 75.2 0.44 
Italy 575.7 644.6 0.76 462.9 513.0 0.69 
Latvia 10.8 17.8 3.39 11.0 17.8 3.28 
Lithuania 19.3 23.5 1.32 13.3 16.3 1.37 
Luxembourg 13.9 15.1 0.55 22.7 24.6 0.55 
Malta 3.5 2.8 -1.48 3.5 3.0 -1.01 
Netherlands 220.8 241.5 0.60 211.8 230.0 0.55 
Poland 373.6 423.1 0.83 388.7 439.6 0.82 
Portugal 87.3 97.3 0.73 87.5 96.6 0.67 
Romania 149.4 189.8 1.61 152.0 192.6 1.59 
Slovakia 50.5 60.7 1.23 49.4 58.9 1.18 
Slovenia 19.7 23.2 1.10 20.5 24.0 1.06 
Spain 449.6 491.8 0.60 441.1 474.8 0.49 
Sweden 70.0 82.6 1.11 67.0 78.0 1.02 
UK 703.8 684.3 -0.19 658.8 622.0 -0.38 
EU27 5211.2 5494.6 0.35 5055.6 5259.6 0.26 
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Table A2. The share of ETS in total emissions (cf. Table A1) in four alternative 
calibrations. 
 EUmin  EUmid*  EUmax  UNFCCC 
 2005 2020 2005 2020 2005 2020 2005 2020 
Austria 0.20 0.22 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.33 0.35 
Belgium 0.18 0.22 0.55 0.57 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.36 
Bulgaria 0.43 0.43 0.67 0.70 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.63 
Cyprus 0.41 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.37 
Czechia 0.44 0.39 0.51 0.47 0.66 0.62 0.49 0.46 
Denmark 0.34 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 
Estonia 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.69 0.80 0.80 
Finland 0.33 0.39 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.55 
France 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 
Germany 0.35 0.37 0.73 0.75 0.53 0.54 0.43 0.44 
Greece 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.40 0.51 0.49 0.60 0.58 
Hungary 0.24 0.25 0.60 0.61 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.40 
Ireland 0.20 0.22 0.39 0.44 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.46 
Italy 0.27 0.28 0.51 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.38 0.40 
Latvia 0.20 0.20 0.43 0.47 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.35 
Lithuania 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.45 
Luxembourg 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.17 
Malta 0.54 0.32 0.52 0.33 0.54 0.32 0.42 0.25 
Netherlands 0.30 0.34 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.47 
Poland 0.46 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.60 
Portugal 0.31 0.34 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.49 
Romania 0.30 0.30 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.47 0.48 
Slovakia 0.31 0.30 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.46 0.48 
Slovenia 0.31 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.42 
Spain 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.50 0.48 0.43 0.42 
Sweden 0.11 0.11 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.30 0.35 
UK 0.32 0.33 0.70 0.72 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.43 
EU27 0.30 0.30 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.43 
* The EUprice scenario uses the same projections as EUmid. 
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Table A3. Unit cost parameters in ETS according to five alternative calibrations; the 
EU27 is the weighted average, using baseline emissions as weights; the last two columns 
show the mean and standard deviation. 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC mean st.dev. 
Austria 13.8 19.8 19.6 19.8 19.1 18.4 2.6 
Belgium 13.8 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.0 18.3 2.6 
Bulgaria 13.0 18.4 18.3 18.4 17.6 17.1 2.3 
Cyprus 13.6 19.9 19.6 19.9 19.0 18.4 2.7 
Czechia 13.3 19.2 18.8 19.2 18.4 17.8 2.5 
Denmark 13.8 20.0 19.8 20.0 19.1 18.5 2.7 
Estonia 13.0 19.0 18.6 19.0 17.8 17.5 2.5 
Finland 13.6 19.7 19.5 19.7 18.8 18.3 2.6 
France 14.1 20.6 20.2 20.6 19.6 19.0 2.8 
Germany 13.6 19.5 19.5 19.5 18.9 18.2 2.6 
Greece 13.5 19.7 19.3 19.7 18.6 18.2 2.6 
Hungary 13.6 19.3 19.4 19.3 18.6 18.0 2.5 
Ireland 13.8 19.9 19.8 19.9 19.0 18.5 2.6 
Italy 13.7 19.7 19.5 19.7 19.1 18.3 2.6 
Latvia 13.7 19.5 19.4 19.5 18.8 18.2 2.5 
Lithuania 13.5 19.7 19.4 19.7 18.9 18.2 2.6 
Luxembourg 14.0 20.2 20.0 20.2 19.2 18.7 2.7 
Malta 13.6 19.9 19.7 19.9 19.1 18.4 2.7 
Netherlands 13.7 19.7 19.5 19.7 18.9 18.3 2.6 
Poland 13.2 19.4 18.8 19.4 18.1 17.8 2.6 
Portugal 13.6 19.5 19.3 19.5 18.7 18.1 2.6 
Romania 13.3 19.0 18.7 19.0 18.1 17.6 2.4 
Slovakia 13.4 19.1 18.8 19.1 18.4 17.8 2.5 
Slovenia 13.6 19.6 19.3 19.6 18.7 18.2 2.6 
Spain 13.7 20.2 19.5 20.2 18.9 18.5 2.7 
Sweden 14.1 20.1 19.9 20.1 19.3 18.7 2.6 
UK 13.7 19.7 19.7 19.7 19.1 18.4 2.6 
EU27 13.6 19.6 19.4 19.6 18.8 18.2 2.6 
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Table A4. Unit cost parameters in non-ETS according to five alternative calibrations; the 
EU27 is the weighted average, using baseline emissions as weights; the last two columns 
show the mean and standard deviation. 
 EUmin EUmid EUmax EUprice UNFCCC mean st.dev. 
Austria 26.6 17.6 17.4 25.6 22.0 21.8 4.3 
Belgium 30.4 16.0 20.1 18.6 23.6 21.7 5.6 
Bulgaria 81.0 65.6 70.8 65.6* 87.4 74.1 9.7 
Cyprus 23.4 28.2 21.7 37.0 25.5 27.2 6.0 
Czechia 58.0 51.0 33.4 51.0* 52.9 49.3 9.3 
Denmark 26.7 29.9 21.0 31.1 25.7 26.9 4.0 
Estonia 24.9 30.2 23.2 29.0 14.9 24.4 6.1 
Finland 36.2 24.5 18.6 12.8 26.7 23.7 8.8 
France 25.4 26.4 20.5 26.1 22.9 24.2 2.5 
Germany 38.9 17.7 24.5 10.9 38.1 26.0 12.4 
Greece 29.2 27.3 22.4 37.8 19.1 27.2 7.2 
Hungary 34.3 18.3 28.8 20.2 28.2 25.9 6.6 
Ireland 23.5 23.5 24.0 24.5 21.3 23.4 1.2 
Italy 26.9 19.1 19.4 39.0 19.5 24.8 8.6 
Latvia 17.3 12.4 14.9 43.4 15.0 20.6 12.9 
Lithuania 22.5 22.2 20.9 15.0 12.8 18.7 4.5 
Luxembourg 23.7 22.0 19.1 40.6 35.4 28.2 9.3 
Malta 21.4 26.8 21.4 47.5 32.1 29.8 10.8 
Netherlands 28.7 26.0 22.9 26.0 26.5 26.0 2.1 
Poland 37.5 48.7 32.5 48.7* 31.7 39.8 8.4 
Portugal 34.6 29.8 29.5 29.8* 33.0 31.3 2.3 
Romania 38.7 28.3 26.5 30.2 30.9 30.9 4.7 
Slovakia 38.3 27.4 25.8 24.1 32.0 29.5 5.7 
Slovenia 24.9 21.0 18.7 62.8 20.3 29.5 18.7 
Spain 21.7 26.7 15.7 55.3 18.3 27.6 16.1 
Sweden 12.8 11.7 11.9 22.1 12.2 14.2 4.5 
UK 38.7 41.3 36.8 9.8 76.6 40.7 23.8 
EU27 32.4 28.2 24.8 32.0 34.7 30.4 3.9 
* As in EUmid. 
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